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When a Member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) adopts a measure which it considers is necessary to 
protect against a health risk, but which constitutes a barrier to international trade in goods, there is a conflict of 
interests. If the measure is removed, the health protection interest is affected negatively. If the measure is kept in 
place, the trade liberalisation interest is affected negatively. Both interests are considered important within the WTO 
regulatory framework, and must therefore be balanced. One part of this balancing act occurs when panels answer 
burden of proof questions in WTO disputes concerning health protection measures. The core questions are: What 
facts must be proved by the parties under the relevant provisions (what are the ‘legal facts’)? What party shall carry 
the heaviest burden of persuading the panel about these facts (what party shall carry the ‘persuasive burden’)? And to 
what extent must the party persuade the panel about the facts (what ‘standard of proof’ shall be applied)? In WTO 
law, there are a number of provisions specifically regulating the adoption of health protection measures. The most 
important are: Article XX(b) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the GATT 1994), and Articles 2, 
3, and 5 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Agreement). The aim 
of this study is to analyse these provisions from a burden of proof perspective. 
The analysis is carried out in Chapters 2-5 of the study. Chapter 2 contains an analysis of the general burden of 
proof concept. The main conclusions reached are that a court cannot normally avoid allocating the persuasive 
burden to one of the parties, and applying a certain standard of proof. When deciding how the burden should be 
allocated, and what standard to apply, the court should primarily rely on arguments related to the desire to reduce the 
risk of an erroneous outcome. Chapter 3 contains a general analysis of how the burden of proof has been handled in 
WTO dispute settlement. The main conclusions from this Chapter are that, even though the adjudicating bodies 
have often addressed the burden of proof in their reports, they have not discussed why the burden should be 
allocated to a certain party, or why a certain standard should be applied. General burden of proof principles have 
been applied with very little discussion. Moreover, they have also relied on the ‘prima facie case’ concept when 
allocating the burden. This concept seems to have little practical relevance, and it is argued that the adjudicating 
bodies should not continue to rely on it in future cases. Chapter 4 contains an analysis of how the legal facts in 
Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994 (and the chapeau of Article XX) have been interpreted, and how the burden of 
proof has been handled under the provision. The main conclusions here are that the adjudicating bodies have not 
provided much guidance in respect of how the existence of a health risk, and the relationship between the measure 
and the risk, should be demonstrated under the provision. The provision has consistently been treated as an 
exception for burden of proof purposes, and the burden has been allocated to the defendant. This entails that the 
trade interest has been favoured, and the health interest disfavoured. Chapter 5 contains an analysis of how the legal 
facts in the relevant paragraphs of Articles 2, 3, and 5 of the SPS Agreement have been interpreted, and how the 
burden of proof has been handled under the provisions. The main conclusions reached are that, even though the 
provisions contain detailed requirements, and even though the adjudicating bodies have provided rather detailed 
interpretations in different disputes, many of the most important legal facts are still unclear. It is for example not 
clear when the scientific evidence should be considered sufficient to perform a risk assessment within the meaning of 
Article 5.1, and what is required from such an assessment. This makes it difficult for the parties to know what to 
prove. More or less all provisions in the SPS Agreement have been treated as general rules for burden of proof 
purposes, and the burden has been allocated to the claimant. This entails that the health interest has been favoured, 
and the trade interest disfavoured. The conclusions of the study are summarised in Chapter 6. The most important 
general conclusion is that the WTO adjudicating bodies should not apply general burden of proof principles. Instead, 
they should examine how the burden of proof should be handled under individual provisions, in light of arguments 
related to the desire to reduce the risk of errors. It is proposed that the default option under the above provisions 
should be to allocate the burden to the claimant, and to apply the balance of probability standard. 
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